In this paper we provide an analytical account of the mechanisms through which globalization
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If one goes beyond correlations, the causal processes through which international economic integration can affect poverty primarily involve the poor in their capacity as workers, as consumers, and as recipients of public services or users of common property resources. Let us first take the case of poor workers in the rural sector. They are mainly either self-employed or wage earners. In the rest of this section I shall discuss of the selfemployed poor, and the next section will be on the poor as wage earners and the poor as consumers. Section IV will be on the poor as recipients of public services or users of common property resources. Section V will conclude.
The self-employed work on their own tiny farms or as artisans and petty entrepreneurs in small shops and household enterprises. The major constraints they usually face are in credit, marketing and insurance, and infrastructure (like roads, power, extension service and irrigation), and government regulations (involving venal inspectors, insecure land rights, etc.). These often require substantive domestic policy and governance changes; foreign traders and investors are not directly to blame. If these changes are not made and the self-employed poor remain constrained, then, of course, it is difficult for them to withstand competition from large agri-business or firms (foreign or domestic).
Let us just cite two examples. Using panel data for farm households in Zambia Deininger and Olinto (2000) show that many households could not reap productivity benefits from external liberalization because they lacked key assets like draft animals and farm implements. Similarly Lopez, Nash, and Stanton (1995) show from panel data of farm households in Mexico that the supply response to price incentives is much lower for households with more limited access to capital. Opening the product markets internationally without doing anything about the weak or distorted factor markets like credit or infrastructural services may thus be a sub-optimal policy for many poor farmers and artisans, both from the point of view of their exploiting new opportunities and of social protection for those who may need extra help to cope .
Measurement of the direct impact of trade reform on poverty is actually quite tricky. Apart from the scarcity of detailed household data before and after trade reform, it is often difficult to disentangle the effects of trade reform from those of other reforms and other events and shocks that affect the household poverty dynamics. One of the few attempts to directly relate trade liberalization with household poverty in the rural sector is by Topalova (forthcoming): she finds that across rural districts in India trade liberalization (primarily agricultural tariff reduction) has significantly slowed poverty reduction. Most existing attempts to measure are really with simulation models.
Litchfield, McCulloch and Winters (2003) is among the first empirical attempts, using household survey data for more than one period in time. For Vietnam in the 1990's, for example, they find in a multinomial logit model that the trade variables have a positive significant effect on a household's chance of escaping poverty.
It is not hard to see that openness to foreign trade and investment may sometimes help in relieving some of the bottlenecks in infrastructure and services and in essential parts, components and other intermediate products like fertilizers and pesticides. Gisselquist and Grether (2000) , for example, show how farmers in Bangladesh benefited as liberalization increased the availability of farm inputs. In a more general sense international diffusion of technology in agriculture, of which the Green Revolution has been a dramatic example, has led to large reductions in poverty, particularly in Asia, even though the larger dependence of farm households on purchased inputs that became necessary increased the importance of the constraints of credit and irrigation.
Small farms or firms that are not severely handicapped by the credit and other constraints are sometimes more productive than their larger counterparts, and are also sometimes more successful in export markets. Small producers are often heavily involved in exports (for example, coffee producers of Uganda, rice growers in Vietnam, shrimp farmers in coastal Bangladesh or India, garment producers in Bangladesh or Cambodia).
But in exports the major hurdle they face is often due to not more globalization but less.
Developed country protectionism and subsidization of farm and food products and simple manufactures (like textiles and clothing) severely restrict their export prospects for poor countries 6 . By estimates of the World Bank, based on the widely used GATP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model, the total income losses incurred by developing countries on account of rich-country trade barriers on textiles and apparel amount to about $24 billion. Taking tariffs and tariff-equivalent of subsidies in agriculture, Cline (2004) estimates that the overall protection in agriculture is about 20 per cent for US, 46 per cent 7 for EU, 52 per cent for Canada, and 82 per cent for Japan. The annual loss to developing countries from agricultural tariffs and subsidies in rich countries is estimated from a static CGE model and the GATP trade and protection database by Cline (2004) to be about $45 billion (and much higher if dynamic effects are taken into account).
I wish the anti-global protesters of rich countries turned their energies toward the vested interests in their own countries which prolong this protectionism and cripple the efforts of the poor of the world to climb out of their poverty. Pro-poor opponents of NAFTA, for example, point out how competition from northern agri-business is destroying the livelihoods of small farmers in Mexico, without being equally vocal about the farm subsidies and tariffs in the U.S. and Canada (now going to be even substantially larger under the new U.S. farm policy) which are, to a large extent, responsible for this. U.S. wheat export prices are estimated to be 46 per cent below cost of production, U.S. corn export prices are at 20 per cent below cost, and so on 8 . It is not surprising that US subsidies in cotton provided a major flashpoint in the breakdown of the WTO's ministerial negotiations in Cancun in September 2003, as this crop is grown by farmers in some of the poorest countries of the world. Of course, this is not to minimize the responsibility of domestic governments. In Mexico, for example, following the peso crisis of 1994 the government abandoned its plans to phase in the trade liberalization gradually; although the Procampo program provided some compensation to the very poor farmers against the price decline, there was a lack of public support infrastructure to enable the small farmers to adjust to new patterns of production necessary to be competitive in the post-NAFTA world.
Another increasingly important barrier to trade many small farmers of developing countries face in world markets is that rich countries now shut out many of these imports under a whole host of safety and sanitary regulations (sometimes imposed under pressure from lobbyists of import-competing farms in those countries). This may actually increase the importance of the need for involving rich-country transnational companies in marketing poor-country products. These companies can deal with the regulatory and lobbying machinery in rich countries far better than the small producers of poor countries can and at the same time can provide to consumers credible guarantees of quality and safety. Of course, these companies will charge hefty fees for this marketing service (usually much larger than the total production cost), and sometimes impose costs which small farmers find difficult to bear. European supermarkets, for example, now insist on criteria for farmers to satisfy that include health and safety rules, product testing, farm audits and staff training. It has been pointed out that farm audits alone cost around $500 per farmer, more than what many farmers earn in the supplying countries in Africa. In some cases tighter control by the retail chains over suppliers to ensure standards and practices has led to a drastic decline in the proportion of exports coming from smallholders-for an example from the case of Kenyan horticulture exports, see Dolan and Sutherland (2002) .
Similarly, it may be very difficult, costly, and time-consuming for small producers of manufactures or services in developing countries to establish brand name and reputation in quality and timely delivery, which are absolutely crucial in marketing, particularly in international markets (much more than comparative costs of production which traditional trade theory emphasizes). This is where multinational marketing chains with global brand names, mediating between domestic suppliers and foreign buyers, will play a dominant role for a long time, and small producers can do worse than paying the high marketing margin they charge. At the same time coordinated attempts on the part of developing countries, with technical and financial assistance from international organizations, to build international quality certification institutions and domestic cooperative marketing organizations for their products should be a high priority.
There is very little hard empirical evidence on the precise figures of marketing margins. There are occasional newspaper reports, for example, that for a 44lb. box of bananas which sell for about $25 in US supermarkets, the producers in Ecuador get only $2 or $3.
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Similarly there are reports that for a shirt that sells for at least $20 in Gap stores in the US, the producer in Hong Kong gets less than $1. Of course, much of the difference is made up of transportation, distribution and inventory costs, but the marketing margins are likely to be substantial. Morisset (1998) There is also the issue of commodity concentration of exports. More than 50 developing countries depend on 3 or fewer primary commodities for more than half of their export. Exports of such products are often a curse as well as a blessing for these countries, as their prices fluctuate wildly and as the economy is too dependent on them.
As a result of recent cases of elimination of the erstwhile inefficiently-run marketing boards and the dismantling of wasteful stabilization schemes, farmers in many African countries now receive a higher fraction 11 of a more volatile (and in some cases, lower) world market price 12 . International commodity agreements among these countries to 11 Unless the public monopsony is replaced by private marketing cartels. 12 See, for example, Gilbert and Varangis (2003) for the case of cocoa. For a whole range of crops in Africa see the analysis in Townsend (1999). control their supply in the world market have not worked very well in the past. For reducing their economic vulnerability there is probably not much alternative to attempts at diversification in production and skill-formation, and gradual movement up the supply chain toward activities with more value addition for the same commodity and arranging at an international level institutions of insurance for farmers in poor countries.
With the opening of the economy just as export crops face new opportunities potentially lifting their producers from poverty, crops where the country may lack comparative advantage will lose out and push their small producers into poverty, if , in a situation of pervasive failure of credit and insurance markets, there is no vigorous program of public adjustment assistance and extension services to help producers to reallocate their resources. The poor growers of traditional crops are often ill-equipped to shift by themselves to the new commercial products like fruits, vegetables, flowers, dairy products, processed foods, etc. These products require new storage and transport infrastructure, large set-up costs, marketing connections, and new legal rules and institutional structures that can facilitate contract farming and agro-processing in a way that does not expose small producers to exploitation by large marketing chains. This is clearly not an argument against globalization but for pro-active public programs to help poor farmers adjust and coordinate. International agencies which preach the benefits of free trade have an obligation to contribute to such programs with financial, organizational and technical assistance.
What has been said in the preceding paragraphs about self-employed farmers is also largely valid for those who are self-employed in non-agricultural activities in the rural sector. Some firms adjust well to new trade opportunities, while others find it difficult to cope with the competition, depending on their initial asset, credit and other infrastructural conditions. Parker, Riopelle and Steel (1995) In some cases, however, intersectoral mobility is limited for prolonged periods. If some factors of production are intersectorally immobile, and some goods are non-traded, real wage of an unskilled worker in a poor country may not go up with trade liberalization even in an otherwise standard model of trade theory. Take a three-good model in a hypothetical African country: one is a non-tradable good (say, a subsistence food crop) is largely grown by women who for various social and economic reasons cannot move to other sectors, another good (say, an exportable tree crop) produced largely by men in a capital-intensive way (maybe simply because tree crops lock up capital for a long period), and the third good is an importable (say, processed food) which is somewhat substitutable in consumption for the subsistence food. In this three-sector model it is not difficult to show that the real wage of women may go down when the importable , and it is unlikely that with liberalization some of the latter will transform themselves into large agriculture-exporting countries. Even in the case of the fewer agriculture-exporting leastdeveloped countries many of them are likely to lose the special preferential status they enjoy under the current regime in some developed markets; for example, many leastdeveloped countries in Africa have duty-and quota-free access to the EU market so that they currently sell in this market at the high EU internal prices. This, of course, does not apply to the recently publicized case of poor countries exporting cotton, as the highest domestic subsidies (depressing world price) are in the US.
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Let us now briefly turn to the case of the poor as recipients of public services.
In the low-income developing countries the poor, particularly those who are in the preponderant informal sector, do not receive much of effective social protection from the state, but the public sector is usually involved in basic services like education and health and public works programs. Cuts in public budgets on these basic services are often attributed to globalization, as the budget cuts to reduce fiscal deficits often come as part of a package of macroeconomic stabilization prescribed by international agencies like the IMF. Trade reforms can bring about a decline in customs revenue (which is usually a substantial source of total government revenue in low-income countries) due to tariff cuts, to the extent these are not compensated by the replacement of the pre-existing quotas by tariffs. But Pritchett and Sethi (1994) analyze the experience of Jamaica, Kenya, and Pakistan on their tariff reductions and found that revenues often fell substantially less than tariff rates did. Much depends on the nature of customs administration, the degree of complexity of the tariff structure, and the scope for expansion of the revenue base following trade reform .
While there is a lot of scope for improvement in the internationally prescribed (occasionally ideologically blinkered) stabilization programs to minimize their adverse impact on the poor, one should keep in mind that the fiscal deficits in these poor 16 In terms of population, roughly one-fifth of the total population of these least-developed countries is in countries are often brought about in the first place more by domestic profligacy in matters of subsidies to the rich, salaries for the bloated public sector or military extravaganza.
Faced with mounting fiscal deficits the governments often find it politically easier to cut the public expenditures for the voiceless poor (along with public investment programs), and that is primarily due to the domestic political clout of the rich who are disinclined to share in the necessary fiscal austerity, and it is always convenient to blame an external agency for a problem that is essentially domestic in origin.
The low quality and quantity of public services like education and health in poor countries is not just due to their relatively low share in the public budget. To a large extent even the limited money allocated in the budget does not reach the poor because of all kinds of top-heavy administrative obstacles and bureaucratic and political corruption.
The development literature is full of accounts of targeting failures in social expenditures.
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Again this is a domestic institutional failure, not largely an external problem. The major effort required here is to strengthen the domestic institutions of accountability.
Apart from basic public services, the poor are also users of common property resources, the decline in which is not usually taken into account in the standard estimates of poverty, based as they are on either household surveys of private consumer expenditure or national income accounts. Environmentalists argue that trade liberalization damages the poor by encouraging overexploitation of the fragile environmental resources (forestry, fishery, surface and groundwater irrigation, grazing lands, etc.) on which the daily livelihoods of particularly the rural poor crucially depend. Here also the answers are actually complex and mere trade restriction is not the solution. The environmental effects of trade liberalization on the rural economy depend on the crop pattern and the methods of production. Take, for example, an African rural economy where the exportable product is a capital-intensive tree crop (like coffee or cocoa), the import-substitute is a landintensive crop (like maize), and there is a labor-intensive subsistence (non-traded) crop one country, Bangladesh, which is a net importer of agricultural goods. In the case of some resource-intensive exports it is difficult for a country by itself to adopt environmental regulations if its international competitors do not adopt them at the same time and have the ability to undercut the former in international markets.
Here there is an obvious need for coordination, in the environmental regulation policies of the countries concerned. Given the low elasticity of demand for many resource-intensive primary export commodities from developing countries in the world market They find no evidence that foreign investment in these countries is related to pollution abatement costs in rich countries. They also find that within a given industry foreign plants are significantly more energy-efficient and use cleaner types of energy compared to their local peers. They find no evidence that foreign investment in these countries is related to pollution abatement costs in rich countries. They also find that within a given industry foreign plants are significantly more energy-efficient and use cleaner types of energy compared to their local peers.
18 Repetto (1994) puts together the estimates of world elasticity of demand for some of the natural resource intensive export commodities of developing countries. For the eight commercial agricultural V In general the debates on globalization often involve a clash of counterfactuals. On one side those who are against the pace of business-as-usual global trade and investment are making a plea for doing something about the jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities for the poor and for small enterprises that are being wiped out, and against the monopolistic practices of giant multinational companies and the environmental damages caused by the economic expansion. So their counterfactual is the world of more social justice and less dominant trading and investment companies, which gives some more breathing space to the poor producers and workers. On the other side the counterfactual for pro-globalizers is the case when there is no (or limited) trade or foreign investment, a world which may be worse for the poor (as it is in the extreme cases of the closed economies of North Korea and Burma). The way out of this clash of counterfactuals is to insist that there are policies that may attempt to help the poor without necessarily undermining the forces of globalization. In this paper we have emphasized that in the medium to long run globalization need not make the poor much worse off, if appropriate domestic policies and institutions are in place and appropriate coordination among the involved parties can be organized. If the institutional prerequisites can be managed, globalization opens the door for some new opportunities even for the poor. Of course, domestic institutional commodities considered by him the absolute value of the elasticity does not exceed 0.5. For tropical timber it is 0.16 for nonconifer logs, 0.74 for nonconifer sawnwood, and 1.14 for nonconifer plywood. reform is not easy and it requires political leadership, popular participation and administrative capacity which are often lacking in poor countries. One can only say that if we keep the focus on agitating against multinational companies and international organizations like the WTO, attention in those countries often gets deflected from the domestic institutional vested interests, and the day of politically challenging them gets postponed. In fact in some cases opening the economy may unleash forces for such a challenge. So instead of pushing for anti-globalization policies if the requisite institutions and policies are not in place, pushing for a package that contains both open-economy policies and those for support infrastructure and social protection may be more successful (both politically and economically).
As in the debates several decades back around 'dependency' theories in development sociology, there is often a tendency to attribute much of the problems of underdevelopment to the inexorable forces of the international economic and political order, ignoring the sway of the domestic vested interests. In many countries rural poverty alleviation in the form of expansion of credit, marketing and extension facilities, or land reform, or public works programs for the unemployed, or provision of education, vocational training, and health need not be blocked by the forces of globalization. This, of course, requires a restructuring of existing budget priorities and a better and more accountable political and administrative framework, but the obstacles to these are often largely domestic (particularly in countries where there are some coherent governance structures in place). In other words, for these countries, globalization is often not the main cause of their problems, contrary to the claim of critics of globalization; just as globalization is often not the main solution of these problems, contrary to the claim of some over-enthusiastic free traders.
All this, of course, does not absolve the responsibility of international organizations and entities in helping the poor of the world, by working toward a reduction of rich-country protection on goods produced by the poor, by energetic anti-trust action to challenge the monopoly power of international (producing and trading) companies based in rich countries, by facilitating international partnerships in research and development of products (for example, drugs, vaccines, crops) suitable for the poor, and by organizing more substantial (and more effectively governed) financial and technology transfers and international adjustment assistance for displaced workers, and help in (legal and technical) capacity building for poor countries in international negotiations and quality certification organizations. Globalization should not be allowed to be used, either by its critics or by its proponents, as an excuse for inaction on the domestic as well as the international front when the matter involved is that of relieving the crushing poverty in the life of billions of people in the world.
